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Venue in Corporate Suits Against
Federal Agencies and Officers
Clifton B. Cates, III*
The burgeoning volume of federal regulatory legislation and
agency rules has profoundly affected private corporations, both
large and small, for they carry on most of the commercial activity
those laws are meant to control. Whatever their intrinsic merits,
laws regulating business practices generally impose time-consum-
ing and expensive restrictions on the profit-oriented activities of
private corporations; not surprisingly, such laws are frequently
resisted by those to whom they apply. Often the validity of these
statutes and regulations, both as drafted and as applied, is
resolved in legal proceedings brought by various federal agencies.
In recent years, however, it has become common for private
corporations to test the validity of a new standard before it is
enforced.
Such preemptive challenges have been facilitated by recent
Supreme Court cases that considerably expand the doctrines of
standing to seek review and ripeness for judicial resolution.'
Regardless of standing and ripeness, however, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bars unconsented suits against the United
States. And while a few federal statutes specifically authorize
suits against the United States or a named federal agency,2 most
regulatory statutes are silent on this matter. Such suits would
be precluded, therefore, but for two important exceptions. First,
sections 701 through 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
3
which apply to all suits for judicial review of agency action
unless the applicable statute precludes judicial review or com-
mits that action to absolute agency discretion, 4 grant liberal
* Associate, Irvins, Phillips & Barker, Washington, D.C.
1. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (standing); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970) (standing); Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967) (ripeness).
2. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-78
(1970); Jones Act § 2, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
4. Id. § 701(a). The phrase "agency action ... committed to
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
standing to those injured, adversely affected, or aggrieved by
agency action 5 to seek review of such "action made reviewable
by statute."" The Supreme Court has interpreted the latter
phrase to mean any agency action that is not explicitly insulated
by statute or clearly inappropriate for judicial review.7 Section
706 accords a reviewing court broad powers to adjudge all rele-
vant legal and factual questions presented and to order appro-
priate relief when, for any number of reasons, agency action is
found deficient. Second, a judicious choice of defendants can
bring many such suits within the judicially created fiction that
an action to prevent an individual government officer in his offi-
cial capacity from acting in excess of his legal authority is not
an unconsented suit against the United States.8 Thus, it is pos-
sible for a private party to avoid the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity and at least get into court.
Yet the ability to bring a suit, while fundamental, is but the
first hurdle that a private plaintiff faces. The plaintiff must
show that the court possesses both subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction over single or multiple defendants.
Moreover, the plaintiff must satisfy the applicable venue re-
quirements; that is, he must bring his action in the proper ju-
dicial district.9
agency discretion by law," which if interpreted literally would undercutjudicial review for abuse of agency discretion, has been narrowly inter-
preted to encompass only those subjects that cannot be evaluated in
accordance with any recognized legal standards and which therefore
must remain a matter of agency choice. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
6. Id. § 704.
7. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The clear implication of this interpretation
is that the provisions for judicial review in the Administrative Procedure
Act will apply to any agency action not specifically exempted by statute
from the prescriptions of the Act.
8. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Noble v. Union
River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893); see American School of Mag-
netic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); cf. Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). But cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949).
9. The term "venue" is nowhere defined in title 28 of the United
States Code. There seems to be no dispute as to its meaning, however.
It has been described as that place where a court's jurisdiction may be
properly exercised, Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1962), and
that "place where a litigant may require the case to be heard," Robert
E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 813 (1961). Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which is the au-
thority to adjudicate a claim, venue "relates solely to the place where
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This Article analyzes the ramifications of the venue rules as
they apply to a corporate plaintiff suing a federal agency or
officer who is acting in his official capacity. The governing
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e), provides four alternative methods
for establishing venue in such a suit. When the meaning or
scope of an alternative is ambiguous, various interpretations of
it will be presented and evaluated with the aim of recommend-
ing the soundest one on which a plaintiff might reasonably rely.
When the possible practical applications of an alternative are not
immediately apparent, suggestions will be offered as to how a
corporate plaintiff might take advantage of the provision and
bring his suit in the district that is for reasons of convenience or
anticipated success most desirable. Finally, when an alternative
is unlikely to be of importance to a corporate plaintiff in such
a suit, that fact will be noted and explained.
I. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e)
Until 1962 venue in civil actions brought against federal
agencies and officers was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which
then provided that
[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial dis-
trict where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided
by law.1 0
In 1962, however, Congress passed the Mandamus and Venue
Act,11 which modified section 1391 (b). Now codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (e), section 2 of the Act superseded 1391 (b) with
respect to civil actions against federal agencies and officers act-
ing in their official capacities by providing that
[a] civil action in which each defendant is an officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his
official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency
of the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law,
be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant
in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3)
any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the
plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.
A sensible interpretation of the change section 1391(e) ef-
fected requires an understanding of the problem that the Man-
jurisdiction should or may be exercised." United States ex rel. Rudick
v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969).
10. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935. In 1966 Congress
amended section 1391(b) to provide for venue in the district "in which
the claim arose." Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111.
11. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 2, 76 Stat. 744.
19751
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damus and Venue Act of 1962 was designed to alleviate.' 2 Be-
fore Congress passed the Act, a private party who sought to
compel a government officer to perform a statutory duty either
had to bring his action in the District of Columbia or not at all.
His choice was limited for two reasons. First, most federal
courts lacked jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Only the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, whose
jurisdiction was considered to have derived not only from Title
28 but also from Maryland law, had jurisdiction to issue these
writs. 13  Second, in actions for review of official acts by govern-
ment officers, venue had been inextricably tied to and limited
by the rule of indispensable parties. Unless the statute enabling
him to seek judicial review in such a case dictated otherwise,
that rule generally required a plaintiff to join as a defendant
some superior officer, usually the agency head himself.14 And
the courts had uniformly held that the residency of agency heads
and most superior officers was the District of Columbia. 15
12. The legislative history of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
appears in S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 1992]. An excellent discussion of the Act is contained
in Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81
HA-v. L. REV. 308 (1967). See also Note, Proper Venue for an Action
When at Least One Defendant Is an Officer vr Employee of the Federal
Government, 57 MwnN. L. REV. 1005 (1973).
13. S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 2. Maryland law governed
the territory ceded to the District of Columbia in 1801, and its courts had
statutory jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Id.
14. Shew v. Southland Corp., 370 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1966); Chournos
v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964); Tejidos Konfort, Inc. v.
McAuliffe, 290 F. Supp. 748 (D.P.R. 1968). See also Bell v. Groak, 371
F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966); Congress of Racial Equality v. Comm'r, 270 F.
Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967); M.G. Davis & Co. v. SEC, 252 F. Supp. 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
15. See, e.g., Stroud v. Benson, 254 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1958) (resi-
dence of the Secretary of Agriculture is Washington, D.C., and he may
be sued only there in his official capacity); Ernst v. Secretary of the In-
terior, 244 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1957) (residence of the Secretary and of
the Department's Solicitor is Washington, D.C.); Trueman Fertilizer Co.
v. Larson, 196 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1952) (official residence of the Admin-
istrator of the General Services Administration is Washington, D.C.);
Podovinnikoff v. Miller, 179 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1950) (residence of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is Washington, D.C.,
where he performs his official duties). See also Environmental Defense
Fund v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
where the court assumed, in the absence of any statement of residence
in the plaintiff's complaint, that the residence of both the Secretary of
the Army and the Chief of the Corps of Engineers is Washington, not
the Eastern District of Arkansas, where the Corps had been engaged in
constructing a dam.
[Vol. 60: 81
VENUE IN CORPORATE SUITS
Needless to say, the unavailability of a forum other than the
District of Columbia posed a considerable burden to plaintiffs
living in other parts of the country. Consequently, the Manda-
mus and Venue Act of 1962 was intended to enable plaintiffs to
sue government officers and agencies in other federal district
courts.16 Thus, section 1(a) of the Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1361,
granted to all federal district courts jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus to compel a government officer to perform a required,
nondiscretionary duty.17 The venue provisions of section 1391(e)
were necessary to implement the new mandamus jurisdiction;1 8
the language of the statute does not so confine their application,
however, and courts construing the section have concluded that
it applies regardless of the form of relief sought,19 with but a
few exceptions.20
In addition to making section 1361 work, the changes in
venue contained in 1391(e) make good practical sense. The
report of the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out that
whether administrative decisions are made in Washington or in
the field, actions challenging them are in reality suits against the
United States; and the Department of Justice customarily had
defended the Government wherever an action against it was
16. The purpose of this bill, as amended, is to make it possible
to bring actions against Government officials and agencies in
United States district courts outside the District of Columbia
which, because of certain existing laws on jurisdiction and
venue, may now be brought only in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.
S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 2. See also Note, supra note 12, at
1007-12.
17. To allay the fears on the part of the Department of Justice that
section 1 (a) as originally drafted might be construed to authorize the
courts to compel a federal officer to act in a manner contrary to his dis-
cretion, Congress amended the section to provide that a court could com-
pel official action only if there is a duty to act, including the duty at
least to make a discretionary decision.
18. For a perceptive analysis of the purposes of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA,
459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Friendly noted that Congress spe-
cifically sought to provide venue outside Washington, D.C. in actions
against local federal officers when their superiors who resided in Wash-
ington would be indispensable parties.
19. See, e.g., Young v. Director, United States Bureau of Prisons, 367
F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (declaratory judgment); English v. Town of
Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (civil rights action);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728
(E.D. Ark. 1970) (injunction); Independent Fish Co. v. Phinney, 252 F.
Supp. 952 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (tax refund suit).
20. See note 29 infra.
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brought.21 Therefore, the Committee reasoned, to require the De-
partment to defend outside Washington would be nothing new
and would not substantially burden the federal government. On
the other hand, to require an aggrieved person who might live
thousands of miles from Washington, D.C. to bring his suit there,
even when the claim arose elsewhere or involved property lo-
cated elsewhere, was unnecessary and unfair. "[T]o tailor our
judicial processes to the convenience of the Government rather
than to provide readily available, inexpensive judicial remedies
for the citizen who is aggrieved by the workings of Govern-
ment"2 2 reflected a peculiarly inverted set of priorities. By
contrast, the Senate Committee observed, the broadened venue
provisions of section 1391(e) would facilitate the prompt and effi-
cient administration of justice by dividing mandamus actions
among all the district courts, thereby allowing local district court
judges to deal with local problems presumably more familiar
to them than to judges in Washington, D.C.2 3
Despite the broad scope of the change it effected, section
1391 (e) remains subject to a number of limitations. For exam-
ple, it explicitly provides that venue is proper in the district in
which the plaintiff resides only if no real property is involved
in the action.24 Apparently Congress agreed with the Depart-
ment of Justice that it would be inappropriate if the Secretary
of the Interior could be sued in Maine by a Maine resident in
an action concerning an oil and gas lease in Wyoming.20
A far more significant limitation inheres in the fact that
section 1391(e) applies "except as otherwise provided by law."
Thus, another federal statute that specifies more limited
venue might be held to restrict the broad reach of 1391(e). The
Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, but the
Court's answer can perhaps be found in Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Corp.,26 a case preceding the enactment of section
1391 (e) which raised a similar question: whether in a patent
infringement action venue was to be determined solely under 28
U.S.C. § 1400 (b), which expressly governs venue in such actions,
or also under the broader provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which
makes no reference to the nature of the claim in specifying where
21. S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (4) (1970).
25. S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 6-7.
26. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
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a corporation may be sued. The Court held that section 1400(b)
was the exclusive source of venue in patent infringement actions
because the legislative history of the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code, which had produced section 1391(c), did not indicate an
intent to change the law on this subject.27
In a case involving section 1391 (e), Paley v. Wolk,28 a dis-
trict court reached a similar conclusion. It held that the liberal
venue provisions of 1391(e) were unavailable in an action
brought to compel the issuance of a patent because 35 U.S.C. §
145 specifically provided for venue in such actions. Similarly,
one court of appeals and one district court have held that 16
U.S.C. § 831 (g), which for venue purposes makes the Tennessee
Valley Authority a resident of the Northern District of Alabama,
constitutes another specific exception to the general venue pro-
visions of 1391 (e).29
By its own terms section 1391 (e) applies only if the federal
officer or employee is sued in his "official capacity," and there-
fore is inapplicable if an officer is sued as a private citizen.30
27. Id. at 227.
28. 262 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Paley
v. Brenner, 386 U.S. 963 (1967).
29. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, Civil No. 1615-71
(D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1971).
Other special venue statutes that may constitute exceptions to sec-
tion 1391 (e) but that will rarely apply to suits brought by corporate
plaintiffs to review the official acts of Government officers or agencies
include the following: 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (actions by banking associations
against the Comptroller General); 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (actions for the re-
covery of fines and forfeitures, including those in admiralty); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1397 (interpleader actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1335); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1398 (review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1399 (partition actions involving the United States); 28 U.S.C. §
1400(a) (copyright actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (Federal Tort Claims
Act actions).
Because of its extraterritorial service provision, see text accompany-
ing notes 36-50 infra, there is considerable uncertainty whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (e) applies to federal habeas corpus cases. Application of the stat-
ute might violate the fundamental habeas principle that the custodian
of the prisoner must be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court
issuing the writ or order to show cause. While the applicability of sec-
tion 1391(e) to the federal habeas corpus statute is beyond the scope of
this Article, a discussion of recent cases on this subject can be found in
1 J. MoorE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 0.142[7], at 1445-47 n.12
(rev. ed. 1974).
30. Paley v. Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Il. 1965), cert. denied sub
noma. Paley v. Brenner, 386 U.S. 963 (1967). But cf. Independent Fish
Co. v. Phinney, 252 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Tex. 1966), in which the district
court held that section 1391(e) determines venue in tax refund suits
19751
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But the precise meaning of "agency of the United States," to
which the section also applies, is not so clear. The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee stated in its report that "agency" should include
"any department, independent establishment, commission, ad-
ministration, authority, board, or bureau of the United States, or
any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary
interest."'3 1 Despite this apparently all-inclusive definition, some
courts have concluded that federal agencies of a particularly
local character are not within the purview of section 1391(e).
Such "local agencies" have included the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA) 32 and local draft boards.33  Moreover, certain
quasi-federal entities, such as federally chartered savings and
loan associations, do not even qualify in the first instance as
agencies of the United States.34
It seems realistic to exempt federally chartered businesses
from the definition of "federal agency" on the theory that the
connection between such organizations and the Government is
one that arises solely from regulation, not from a responsibility
to execute governmental policy. Exclusion of the TVA from the
scope of section 1391 (e) might be similarly explained. Although
wholly owned by the federal government, the TVA exists merely
to provide energy at a profit, not to carry out the laws of its
creator. The same cannot be said for local draft boards, how-
ever, since they exist wholly to execute the policy of the Selec-
tive Service System.3 5
brought against a district director of Internal Revenue as an individual,
because he is in reality acting in his official capacity.
31. S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 4.
32. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1972). This case may be read more narrowly, however, as rest-
ing on the finding that 16 U.S.C. § 831 (g) constitutes a specific exception
to the broad provisions of section 1391 (e).
33. Powers v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub
nom. Powers v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 967 (1972); Holicky v. Selective
Serv. Bd. No. 3, 328 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Colo. 1971).
34. Masterson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 F.R.D. 313
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Chase Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd., 269 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
35. Since the 1962 Act was intended to relieve individuals who
might reside thousands of miles from the predetermined forum district
from having to litigate far from home, it might be argued that a local
draft board is only an aggregation of private citizens who reasonably
might be exempted from the provisions of section 1391 (e). If, for ex-
ample, a suit were instituted in Washington, D.C. against a Selective
Service officer and the plaintiff's local draft board was deemed an indis-
pensable party, the extraterritorial service provision of 1391 (e), see text
accompanying notes 36-50 infra, would operate to bootstrap the members
[Vol. 60:81
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In any event, section 1391 (e) does far more than simply de-
scribe venue in suits brought against government officers or
agencies. Indeed, the section substantially enlarges the personal
jurisdiction of the federal district courts. If venue can be prop-
erly laid under any one of its four paragraphs, its final sentence
then provides for extraterritorial service of process by certified
mail:
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served
as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that
the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or
agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail
beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action
is brought.
According to one court,30 this language effectively supersedes
federal rule 4(d) (5), which provides that service on an officer
or agency of the United States must be accomplished by serving
the United States and by delivering a copy of the summons and
the complaint to the appropriate officer. Authority for statu-
tory exceptions to rule 4(d) (5) is expressly provided by rule
4(f), which otherwise limits the effective service to the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is located. And
since the Supreme Court consistently has held that Congress has
the authority to provide that service of process for the federal
district courts may run throughout the country,37 the section
1391 (e) service provision appears perfectly valid.
A federal court's acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant is in most instances unrelated to the laws of venue,
which merely determine where the action may be heard.38 Sec-
of the board into the District of Columbia court. Thus, the Government
might find considerable difficulty in persuading even public-spirited citi-
zens to serve-and serve without pay-in an unpleasant but necessary
job.
The better argument, however, is that section 1391(e) was designed
to ease the burden on private plaintiffs only, and that if the Government
chooses to enforce its laws through a committee of private citizens, they
too should fall within the full reach of the section if and when they be-
come codefendants of the Government. There is no reason why the Gov-
ernment cannot represent and reimburse them just as it does its fulltime
employees when they are sued on account of their official acts.
36. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 340 F. Supp.
400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1972).
37. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v.
Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
38. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d), 4(e), and 4(f) (manner of acquir-
ing personal jurisdiction and territorial limits of service) with 28 U.S.C.
§§1391 (a) - (d) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1392-1403 (determination of venue only).
1975]
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tion 1391 (e) is unusual in that it makes the availability of extra-
territorial service depend on the availability of venue under the
first part of the section. Once venue is established, moreover,
section 1391(e) provides personal jurisdiction virtually auto-
matically.5 9 After laying venue under any one of the alterna-
tives listed in section 1391 (e), the plaintiff may simply serve a
federal officer by mail.40 Thus, the statute eliminates the prob-
lem a plaintiff faced before 1962 of having to make personal
service on an officer at his official residence.4 '
Extraterritorial service of process is necessary in certain
instances to ensure that the choice of venue authorized under
section 1391 (e) is not rendered meaningless for want of personal
jurisdiction. It offers a plaintiff a means to satisfy the rule of
indispensable parties,42 which requires dismissal of an action
when the plaintiff does not or cannot join parties whose partici-
pation in the lawsuit is considered absolutely necessary. 43 For
example, section 1391(e) (1) provides that venue may lie in any
district in which a defendant resides. Assume that two indis-
pensable federal officer defendants reside in District A and in
District B (another state), respectively. Although venue in
either district would be proper, without the extraterritorial
service provision the plaintiff would be unable to serve the
defendant residing in District A if suit were instituted in District
B and would be unable to serve the defendant residing in District
B if suit were brought instead in District A.44 Thus, suit would
39. Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 (2d Cir.
1970).
40. Ellingburg v. Connett, 457 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1972); McKenna
v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Preuss v. Udall, 359 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964).
41. See, e.g., Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925);
cases cited in note 15 supra.
42. The 1966 amendment to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure replaced the term "indispensable party" with the phrase
"persons needed for a just adjudication" and a set of practical guidelines
by which a court was to determine when the presence of a party was so
important that the action should not proceed without his joinder.
Nevertheless, "indispensable party" remains common parlance among
lawyers and, despite its semantic inaccuracy, adequately conveys the
intent of rule 19.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) and cases cited in 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINIs-
TRATiVE LAw § 27.08 (Supp. 1965). See also Davis, Suing the Govern-
inent by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHr. L. REv. 435,
442-51 (1962).
44. In the absence of a statute like section 1391(e), FED. R. Civ. P.
4(f) restricts service to the territorial limits of the state in which the
district court sits, except that certain parties may be served outside the
state at any point within 100 miles of the courthouse.
[Vol. 60:81
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have been dismissed in either district for the unavoidable failure
to join and serve an indispensable party. Recognizing this prob-
lem in Powelton Civic Home Owners Association v. Department
of HUD,45 the district court viewed the extraterritorial service
provision as a device designed to ensure that a plaintiff would not
be "whipsawed" out of a forum established by statute for want of
personal jurisdiction over a necessary defendant.
While the service provision in section 1391(e) cannot save a
plaintiff who simply neglects to join the proper defendants,46 it
is now possible for a plaintiff to sue one of the federal defendants
and then to join all the additional indispensable federal defend-
ants by serving them by certified mail.47 Although compliance
with the terms of any paragraph in the section will make venue
proper as to all federal defendants, 48 venue as to indispensable
private parties must be satisfied under a provision other than
section 1391 (e),49 such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (b), (c), or (d). By
the same token, 1391(e) does not provide for nationwide service
of process on nonfederal defendants. 50
II. VENUE IN THE DISTRICT WHERE
A DEFENDANT RESIDES
Section 1391 (e) (1) lays venue in any judicial district in
which "a defendant in the action resides." Like each of the
other paragraphs of 1391 (e), however, paragraph 1 relates back
to the introductory language of the section:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee
of the United States . . .acting in his official capacity . . .or
an agency of the United States, may, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which:
[emphasis added].
If "each defendant" were read literally, section 1391 (e) would
apply only to suits in which the sole defendant is a federal offi-
cer or agency, or suits in which all defendants fit either category.
Under this approach, if a private party were deemed indispen-
45. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
46. See McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dredge
Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964); Powers v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d
212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Powers v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 967(1972). All involved the plaintiff's failure to join an indispensable party.
47. 3 K. DAvis, ADinZNISTATvE LAW § 27.08 (Supp. 1970); Leber v.
Canal Zone Cent. Labor Union & Metal Trades Council, 383 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1967).
48. See text accompanying notes 51-58 in ra.
49. McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
50. See the last sentence of Section 1391 (e).
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sable to a suit brought against a federal officer or agency, 1391
(e) would not apply. Venue as to all defendants would have to
be satisfied under some other provision, and section 1391(b)
probably would be the only other choice. Again there would be
a danger of "whipsawing" a plaintiff out of a forum. If the pri-
vate party and the federal defendants resided in different dis-
tricts of different states, venue as to both would be proper only
in the district where the claim arose, and the plaintiff would
have no extraterritorial service provision under which to serve
the defendants who did not reside in that district. With two
exceptions, however, courts that have confronted this problem
have reasoned that a literal reading would defeat the purpose of
the statute and therefore have held. that "each defendant" refers
only to those defendants who reside outside the judicial district
in which the suit is brought. 5' Thus, when the private party is a
resident of that district, section 12.91 (e) remains fully applica-
ble. According to this interpretation, a plaintiff may join non-
federal defendants if they are subject to service of process within
the district.5
2
The power of paragraph I of section 1391 (e) is packed into
one word: "a." Venue lies in any judicial district in which a
defendant resides. Thus, if a suit must be brought against more
than one federal defendant (or if the plaintiff can legitimately
join additional federal defendants), and if venue is proper as to
any one of them, then venue is proper as to all defendants, and
those residing outside the district may be served by certified
mail.58
This technique was partially approved in Nestor v. Her-
shey,54 a case in which a graduate student brought suit in federal
district court in Washington, D.C. against General Hershey, the
51. Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1970); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Denver & R.G.W. Ry.,
290 F. Supp. 612, 615-16 (D. Colo. 1968), affd on other grounds, 411 F.2d
1115 (10th Cir. 1969); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Depart-
ment of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Contra, Stinson v.
Finch, 317 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Chase Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 269 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
52. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); People of
Saipan v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii
1973); Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp,
742 (N.D. III. 1970) (dictum).
53. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Powelton
Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
54. 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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director of the Selective Service System; individual members of
the plaintiff's Missouri draft board; and other officials of the
Selective Service System. The student sought an injunction
against his impending induction as well as a writ of mandamus
to compel the appropriate official to reclassify him I-S. The
government argued that venue in the District of Columbia was
improper on two grounds: General Hershey was not a proper
party to grant the relief sought and the remaining defendants
did not reside in the District. The court of appeals concluded
that General Hershey was a proper party, however, since he
was intimately linked to the formulation and execution of Selec-
tive Service policy; he did in fact possess the power to grant the
relief sought; and as a public official he resided in the District
of Columbia. Because venue in the District was proper with
respect to General Hershey under 1391 (e) (1), it was also proper
as to the remaining defendants:
Since our District Court is a proper forum for the case against
General Hershey by virtue of the general federal venue statute,
the other defendents [sic] are also properly in court here if per-
sonal jurisdiction was obtained over them. Section 1391(e)
requires only that once it is determined that "each defendant
is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof acting in his official capacity," then venue is proper in
any judicial district in which "a defendant * * * resides." 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1391 (e) (1964) (Emphasis added). Personal juris-
diction over the nonresident appellees from Missouri and Mary-
land was established when without objecting they entered a
general appearance through the United States Attorney. Fed.
R.Civ.P. 12(h).55
The court of appeals proposed a series of test questions for
determining whether a plaintiff legitimately could use one de-
fendant officer as the basis for bringing other defendants within
the scope of 1391(e): (1) Is the target defendant substantially
involved in the actions that gave rise to the claim so that
he fairly qualifies as a proper party? (2) Does that defendant
maintain his official residence in the district in which the suit
is brought? (3) Is each defendant an officer or agency of the
United States? (4) Did the plaintiff manage to obtain personal
jurisdiction over all the defendants? 56
Whether, once venue had been established as to General
55. Id. at 522. By "general federal venue statute" the court meant
section 1391 in its entirety, not simply section 1391 (b), which only gov-
erns venue in nondiversity cases that arise under federal law. Id. at 521.
56. Id. at 521-22. With respect to its first question, the court con-
cluded that the target defendant must be automatically found to be a
proper party if he possesses power to grant the desired relief.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Hershey, the nonresident individual draft board members could
have been served by certified mail was a question the court did
not have to answer, since the other defendants had entered a
general appearance. As previously noted,57 the courts might
exempt individual draft board members from the extraterrito-
rial service provision of 1391(e) if they consider draft boards
"local agencies" of the federal government to which the section
was not intended to apply.
But whatever may be the applicability of section 1391 (e) to
draft boards and "local agencies," they constitute a class of fed-
eral defendants that a corporate plaintiff would be unlikely to
sue. Certainly the more typical federal defendant-a regulatory
agency or executive department or an officer thereof-falls
within the group the section explicitly embraces. In that con-
nection, the Nestor v. Hershey decision would seem to permit a
corporate plaintiff to choose one conveniently situated federal
defendant, perhaps a high-ranking officer of an agency's local
office, and use him as a vehicle for bootstrapping the real de-
fendant, the agency head, into a local forum. Although section
1391 (e) (1) does not require that the target defendant reside in
the district of the plaintiff's residence, convenience and economy
would make an officer residing therein a logical choice, partic-
ularly if the corporate plaintiff lacks the resources to sue in
some remote district. Additionally, the plaintiff might believe
that his chances of success on the merits would be greater at
home than in Washington, D.C. or elsewhere, particularly if the
court of appeals for the circuit encompassing his local district
already had evinced a favorable interpretation of the legal issues
presented.
The only real limitation that the Nestor opinion places on
this bootstrapping technique is that the target defendant must
be a proper party to the action.58 While the language of 1391
(e) (1) contains no such restriction, it must be remembered that
the section does not relieve a plaintiff from the responsibility
of suing the right officer; 59 consequently, the gloss Nestor im-
poses on 1391 (e) (1) seems to be justified. Of course, since
Nestor is the only case that explicitly has approved the use of
1391 (e) (1) suggested by this Article, compliance with its inter-
pretation of the provision seems advisable.
57. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
58. Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 505, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
59. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
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With respect to the question of what type of federal de-
fendant constitutes a proper party to the action, it is doubtful
that a minor local functionary, even though an "officer" of the
relevant agency or department, would qualify. Less clear is the
question whether the chief officer of a regional branch of a
federal agency would meet the test. In Nestor the court of ap-
peals stressed the fact that General Hershey, the target defend-
ant, had the power to grant the relief requested-namely, reclas-
sification of the student plaintiff. A regional administrator of a
federal agency might not measure up to this standard, especially
if the agency in Washington had already issued a cease and de-
sist order, a price rollback order, or some other mandate requir-
ing an affirmative act. It could well be argued, however, that
the regional administrator would possess the power to grant the
relief sought if before any order issued the corporate plaintiff
sued to enjoin him from referring the results of his investigation
and his recommendations to Washington for further action.
While courts are reluctant to intervene in the workings of a
federal agency before the agency reaches a final decision,60 they
will intervene if a plaintiff demonstrates clear illegality or
immediate and irreparable harm.61 Moreover, while Nestor
stressed the power to grant the relief requested as the touch-
stone of proper joinder, the court of appeals also regarded as
significant General Hershey's considerable influence and au-
thority over the other defendants-the power to make general
policy, reclassify registrants, order reconsideration of cases, and
entertain registrants' appeals. While it seems that only a supe-
rior officer could possess this kind of "influence," in some agen-
cies and departments the decisions of local officers may predeter-
mine the final decisions of their nominal superiors in Washing-
ton.0
2
A definitive description of the kind of federal officer who
constitutes a suitable defendant cannot be established until the
60. See, e.g., Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962); Robertson v. Cham-
bers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951); SEC v. Otis & Co., 338 U.S. 843 (1949); Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
61. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951);
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939);
United States ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. v. ICC, 252 U.S. 178 (1920).
62. This is true, for example, in the Interior Department's Bureau
of Land Management, where final decisions whether to issue patents on
mineral claims depend heavily on the recommendations made by officials
on the scene.
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standards set forth in Nestor v. Hershey are developed in sub-
sequent cases. In the meantime, a corporate plaintiff deter-
mined to lay venue under section 1391(e)(1) must do its best
to choose as a target defendant an officer who possesses sub-
stantial power to determine how the law in question will be
enforced. It is important to remember, however, that 1391(e)
provides four alternative methods of establishing venue in a
civil action against a government agency or officer acting in
his official capacity. Compliance with any one of them is suf-
ficient not only to lay venue but also to invoke the extrater-
ritorial service provision contained in the last sentence of the
section. Consequently, a prudent corporate plaintiff may at-
tempt to show that venue is proper not only with respect to a
defendant under section 1391(e) (1), but also under 1391(e) (2),
where the cause of action arose; or under 1391(e) (3), where
any realty involved in the action is situated; or under 1391(e) (4),
where the plaintiff resides, if no realty is involved.
III. VENUE IN THE DISTRICT WHERE A PLAINTIFF
RESIDES
Paragraph 4 of section 1391(e) provides that a civil action
against federal officers or agencies may be brought in the dis-
trict in which "the plaintiff resides if no real property is in-
volved in the action." Residence poses no problem for the in-
dividual, noncorporate plaintiff. With little or no discussion
courts have assumed that the residence of such a plaintiff is his
domicile. 63 Section 1391(e) (4) refers, however, to the residence
of "the plaintiff," an anomaly which suggests that paragraph 4
might be limited to single-plaintiff cases or multiple-plaintiff
cases where all plaintiffs reside in the forum district. For-
tunately, courts have ignored what appears to have been a se-
mantic error in statutory drafting. n order to avoid construing
the statute to exclude most suits brought by more than one
plaintiff, federal courts have uniformly read "the plaintiff" to
mean one or more of the plaintiffs. 114 Thus, if one plaintiff is a
63. Ellingburg v. Connett, 457 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1972); McEachern
v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963); English v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Independent Fish Co. v. Phinney,
252 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
64. Candarini v. Attorney Gen., 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544: (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub noma. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973),
motion to stay denied, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Natural Re-
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resident of the forum district, venue as to all is proper.
Undoubtedly the most vexatious and controversial issue
produced by section 1391(e) is defining the residence of a cor-
porate plaintiff. Since the fourth paragraph of the section offers
no guidance in this respect, lower courts have sought illumina-
tion"5 from section 1391(c), a companion provision that specif-
ically refers to the residence of corporations for venue pur-
poses: (0
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes [emphasis added].
But whether section 1391(c) justifiably can be relied on to pro-
vide a definition of the residence of corporate plaintiffs is a
matter of serious disagreement. It is not apparent on the face of
that section whether it applies only to corporate defendants or,
on the other hand, defines the residence of corporate plaintiffs as
well. Countless lower federal courts have addressed this fun-
damental question, and they have split about evenly. 67 The
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). Much the same
interpretative technique was employed in eliminating the restrictive im-
plications of the phrase "each defendant" in the opening sentence of
section 1391(e). See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
65. Section 1391(c) is relevant in determining venue insofar as it
depends on corporate residence not only in federal question cases, see
McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Abbott Laboratories,
Inc. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd on other grounds
sub noma. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); but
also in diversity cases, section 1332(c) notwithstanding. See Manchester
Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970); Robert E. Lee &
Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813
(1962). Cf. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Al-
though Freiday was a shareholder's derivative suit, which for purposes
of venue is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1401, the court examined section
1391(c) to determine when under section 1401 "the corporation might
have sued the same defendants."
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), which also defines corporate residence, is
not an appropriate basis for resolving this issue, because that section is
addressed not to venue but to the scope of the federal district courts'
original jurisdiction founded on diversity of citizenship. See, e.g.,
Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austad & Sons, Inc., 343 F.2d 7
(8th Cir. 1965); Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323
(N.D. Tex. 1964); Reader v. Corpus Christi Ref. Co., 111 F. Supp. 756
(S.D. Tex. 1952).
67. Cases in which it has been held that section 1391(c) applies to
corporate plaintiffs include Strick Corp. v. Cravens Homalloy (Shef-
field), Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Campbell v. Triangle Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pace Co. v. Department of the Army,
344 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp.
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Supreme Court specifically adverted to the split of authority
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,68 but declined to rule on this
"difficult . . . [question] with far-reaching effects," because the
court of appeals had not fully dealt with it in its opinion.
Since the Supreme Court has yet to provide any helpful
guidance, the scope of section 1391(c) remains ambiguous. Any
sound construction of the section, which figures so prominently
in construing section 1391 (e) (4), -herefore necessitates an ex-
amination of the problems that 1391(c) was designed to remedy,
its language, and the relative merits of the two polar readings
of its scope. For 56 years preceding the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code, of which section 1391(c) was a part, the Supreme
Court consistently had held that a corporation is a resident of
241 (W.D. Mich. 1969); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271 F.
Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Celebrezze, 235 F.
Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 360 F.2d 677
(2d Cir. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 159 (1967); Consolidated
Sun Ray, Inc. v. Steel Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Trav-
elers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 164 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1958), affd, 265
F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1959); Standard Ins. Co. v. Isbell, 143 F. Supp. 910
(E.D. Tex. 1956); Eastern Motor Express v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp.
426 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Southern Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F.
Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105
F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Ralston Purina Co. v. United States, 1952
A.M.C. 1496 (E.D. La. 1952); Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Cases in which it has been held that section 1391 (c) applies only to
corporate defendants include Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970); Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co. v. Hughes, 323
F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1963); Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434
(4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962); DC Electronics, Inc. v.
Schlesinger, 368 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Anderson Motor Serv., 339 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Mo. 1971); U-Profit, Inc.
v. Bromley Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Smith v. Murchison,
310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Control Data Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 274 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc. v. Nationwide Theatres Inv. Co., 269 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Fulton, 261 F. Supp. 997 (D. Colo. 1966);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. South Portland Eng'r Co., 252 F. Supp. 149
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Dixie Portland Flour MWills, Inc. v. Dixie Feed & Seed
Co., 272 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Tenn. 1965), affd, 382 F.2d 830 (6th Cir.
1967); L'Heureux v. Central Am. Airways Flying Serv., Inc., 209 F. Supp.
713 (D. Md. 1962); Nebraska-Iowa Bridge Corp. v. United States, 158 F.
Supp. 796 (D. Neb. 1958); Albright & Friel, Inc., v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Olberding v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 346 U.S. 338
(1953), reaches a result consistent with these cases without discussing
the issue.
See also Note, The Proposed Revision of the Federal Judicial Code,
60 HAnv. L. Rxv. 425 (1947); Note, Federal Venue and a Corporate Plain..-
tiff: Judicial Code Sec. 1391(c), 28 IND. L.J. 256 (1953).
68. 387 U.S. 136, 156-57 n.20 (1967).
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the state and of the district in which it was incorporated. 69 When
coupled with the statutes governing venue, which, before the
1948 revision, had limited suit to the district of a defendant's resi-
dence,7° the Court's narrow definition of corporate residence
drastically limited those districts in which a corporate defendant
could be sued.
Before 1887 the result had not been so severe. The Judiciary
Act of 187571 provided that venue in a civil action would lie
not only in a district in which the defendant was an "inhabitant"
but also in any district "in which he shall be found at the time of
service or commencement of the action." Although "inhabitant"
was taken to mean "resident," and a corporation was then, as
later, deemed to be a resident of the place of its incorporation,
the Supreme Court's 1887 decision in Ex parte Schollenberger"
brought corporate defendants within the second venue option.
In that case, the Court held that a corporation necessarily "con-
sented" to be found in any state where by law it was obliged to
designate an agent for service of process. Shortly thereafter,
however, the Judiciary Act of 188773 eliminated venue in the dis-
trict where the defendant was found, and the consent theory
lost its usefulness. It was then impossible for a plaintiff in fed-
eral court to sue a corporation, even one with business activities
in many states, in any district except the one in which it was
incorporated.
69. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948); Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441 (1945); Burnrite Coal
Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 211 (1927); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
270 U.S. 496, 499 (1926); Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. R.R., 270 U.S. 363, 366 (1926); General Inv. Co. v. Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 274-79 (1922); Male v. Atchison,
Topeka & SF. Ry., 240 U.S. 97, 102 (1916); Ladew v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 218 U.S. 357, 367 (1910); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 215 U.S. 501, 509 (1910); In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S.
221, 229 (1895); Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 205 (1892);
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892).
The Suttle decision, supra, was handed down just weeks before the
revised judicial code containing section 1391 (c) was signed into law.
70. Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213; Act of Sept. 19, 1922,
ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849; Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1101; Act of
Aug. 13, 1888, § 1, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 434; Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1,
24 Stat. 552. The statutes provided for venue in the district in which a
defendant was an inhabitant; courts uniformly construed "inhabitant" to
mean "resident." See, e.g., Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 449
(1892).
71. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
72. 96 U.S. 369 (1887).
73. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, as amended, Act
of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 52 Stat. 433.
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Fifty-two years later the Supreme Court revived the Schol-
lenberger consent theory in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp.74 Despite the elimination by the Judiciary Act of
1887 of venue where the defendant was found, the Court held
that a foreign corporation's qualification to do business 75 in a
state and its appointment of an agent for service of process con-
stituted actual consent to be sued in both the state and federal
courts of that state and a waiver of the objection to venue.7 6
And while Neirbo was a diversity case, the courts extended the
waiver doctrine to accommodate federal question cases where
federal and state courts had concurrent jurisdiction 7 and even
federal question cases over which the federal courts had ex-
clusive jurisdiction and which arose under statutes containing
their own venue rules.78
But the Neirbo waiver rule had its loopholes. First, it did
not apply unless a corporation had actually qualified to do busi-
ness; doing business illegally without qualifying or appointing
an agent was not enough. 79 Far more significantly, in Suttle
v. Reich Brothers Construction Co.8 0 the Supreme Court held
that consent by qualification did not satisfy a venue statute that
specifically required corporate residence. Suttle involved a
negligence action brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana
on grounds of diversity of citizenship by a Mississippi resident
against several defendants: a Texas corporation that had qual-
ified to do business in Louisiana and was therefore amenable to
suit in either the Eastern or Western Districts of that state; a
partnership situated in the Western District; and the individual
members of the partnership who were residents of the Western
District. Section 52 of the Judicial Code of 191181 provided
74. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
75. For a discussion of what constitutes "doing business," see text
accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
76. 308 U.S. at 175.
77. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S.
4 (1939).
78. See, e.g., Guisti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
1946) (antitrust acts); locono v. Anastasio, 75 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Bennett v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F.
Supp. 871 (D.Md. 1940) (Jones Act).
79. Knobloch v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 154 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1946); Moss
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1945); Robinson v. Coos
Bay Pulp Corp., 147 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1945); Donahue v. M.A. Henry Co.,
78 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
80. 333 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1948).
81. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, . 52, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970).
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that if there were two or more defendants residing in different
districts of the state, suit could be brought in either district.
The Supreme Court concluded that while the corporation's
qualification to do business constituted implicit waiver to ob-
ject to venue under Neirbo, that fact did not make the corpora-
tion a resident of the Eastern District; the corporation's residence
remained its district of incorporation, somewhere in Texas.
Since the partnership and its members had not consented to
venue in the Eastern District, and since no defendant was a
resident thereof, the suit consequently could be brought only
in the Western District. Thus, even though a single corporation
could be sued in a district in which it merely had qualified to
do business, the Suttle decision effectively precluded joinder of
corporate defendants that were incorporated in different states,
unless, of course, they affirmatively waived objection to venue.
Given the Suttle limitation, the Neirbo waiver theory provided
inadequate relief from the general rule, which limited venue in
actions against a corporate defendant to the place of its incor-
poration.
Section 1391(c) laid Neirbo and Suttle to rest. Rather than
relying on fictions to enlarge a plaintiff's choice of venue,
Congress did so directly by providing that a corporation may
be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated,
licensed to do business, or doing business, and by making any
such district the corporation's residence for venue purposes.
The state of incorporation and districts in which a corporation
is licensed to do business can be easily determined by checking
with the appropriate secretaries of state. If a state contains
more than one judicial district, however, the courts have split
as to whether a corporation resides in every district of the state
of its incorporation, or only in the district in which it is incor-
porated or licensed to do business.82
82. Decisions which have held that a corporation is a resident of
every district of the state in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business include Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Hawkins v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Baksay v.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 281 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); De
George v. Mandata Poultry Co., 196 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Robert
E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 195 F. Supp. 528 (W.D.S.C. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962);
Minter v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Johnstone v. York County Gas Co., 193 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Garbe v. Humiston-Keedling & Co., 143 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Ill. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
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Where a corporation is "doing business" for purposes of
section 1391(c) is less easy to determine. While the standard
certainly is satisfied by a corpocation engaging in sufficient
commercial activity to require it to obtain a license and appoint
an agent for service of process,8 3 to read "doing business" to re-
quire this much activity would be to obliterate whatever dis-
tinction Congress intended between that phrase and the phrase
"licensed to do business." One plausible approach to distin-
guishing the two is to read "doing business" to mean that degree
of activity, short of that which requires a license, which con-
stitutes sufficient minimum contact with the forum jurisdiction
to justify extraterritorial personal jurisdiction under the due
process standards laid down in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.4
In Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 5 the district court
squarely posed the problems that this ambiguous phrase raises:
1. Should Federal or State law govern the interpretation of
the phrase "doing business" as contained in the venue section,
1391 (c) of the United States Code;
2. Should Federal or State law be applied in deciding whether
a corporation is "doing business" within the judicial district of
the court so that it is "present" for jurisdictional purposes and
thus amenable to service;
3. Should the same test for "doing business" be applied to
both instances[?] 8 6
The court then answered its own questions. First, the
meaning of "doing business" under section 1391(c) is solely a
matter of federal law. Second, in diversity cases the question
whether a corporation is "doing business" within the state or
federal district is a matter of substantive law and is therefore
846 (1957); Hintz v. Austenal Laboratcries, 105 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.Y.
1952).
Decisions which have held that a corporation can only be used in
the district where it is incorporated or licensed to do business include
Fuller & Dees Marketing Group v. Outstanding Am. High School Stu-
dents, 335 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Energy Resources Group, Inc.
v. Energy Resources Corp., 297 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Westerman
v. Grow, 198 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Johnson v. B.G. Coon Constr.
Co., 195 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Sawyer v. Soaring Soc'y of Amer-
ica, 180 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
83. Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ill.
1958); Remington Rand v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1956).
84. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
85. 166 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. fll. 1958).
86. Id. at 793-94.
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governed by state law. 7 Finally, the court concluded, the same
test of "doing business" is not necessarily appropriate for deter-
mining both venue and personal jurisdiction. While doing
business for purposes of personal jurisdiction is a matter of
state lawss-limited only by the minimum sufficient contacts
standard, doing business for purposes of section 1391(c) requires
a greater degree of activity-that which would be sufficient to
warrant obtaining a license.8 9
The court's answer to its second question was clearly an
accurate statement of the law. So was its answer to its first
question-at least insofar as it signifies that because of the
supremacy clause, the scope of section 1391(c) cannot be auto-
matically fixed by the meaning that any state law has given
to the term "doing business." The court's answer to its third
question, however, was unsound. It has the effect of equating
"doing business" with being "licensed to do business," thus rob-
bing "doing business" of any independent significance. More-
over, it inverts the relative importance of venue and personal
jurisdiction. If there is sufficient contact with the forum state
to create in personam jurisdiction consistent with due process,
there appears to be no reason why venue, which traditionally
has been considered far less basic to a lawsuit than personal ju-
risdicton, should be more difficult to attain than personal juris-
diction. If it is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" to make a nonresident amenable to suit
within a state, the defendant should not be able to escape simply
by interposing an objection to venue. If venue is truly inappro-
priate, a better remedy exists.9 0 Thus, it seems that a better
interpretation of "doing business" would be that if a corporation
is subject to personal jurisdiction on account of its activity
within a state, it should also be regarded as "doing business"
87. That result is required by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1970), as it has been construed in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and their
progeny.
88. In the instant case, section 17 of the fllinois Civil Practice Act.
89. 166 F. Supp. at 798. Accord, Carter v. American Bus Lines, 169
F. Supp. 460 (D. Neb. 1959); Bar's Leaks W. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp.
710 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Remington Rand v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See also Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co.,
183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950) (amenability to service under a nonresident
motorist statute is not "doing business" for the purposes of section
1391(c)).
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) (change of venue to district
where action "might have been brought"). See also Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335 (1960) (interpreting section 1404(a)).
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there for purposes of laying venue under section 1391(c). A
number of courts have reached this result.91
The significance of the addition of section 1391(c) to the
Judicial Code goes beyond the fact that the section specifically
increased the number of districts where venue might lie. Proper
venue no longer depends on the Neirbo fiction that actual qualifi-
cation to do business constitutes consensual waiver of the right to
object to venue. Under 1391(c), if a corporation is found to be
doing business in a district, venue lies therein even though the
corporation has wrongfully failed to qualify under state law and
therefore has not "consented" to be sued there. Quite simply,
state definitions of the scope of consent are irrelevant.
92  Of
course, a defendant may still waive the defense of improper
venue, but waiver is now the product of either deliberate inaction
or inadvertence. 93
After enlarging the number of districts in which a corpora-
tion may be sued to include any judicial district in which the
corporation is licensed to do business or is doing business, section
1391(c) goes on to state that "such judicial district shall be re-
garded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
This language, then, gives rise to the immediate problem:
whether this expanded definition of corporate residence also de-
fines the residence of corporate plaintiffs for the purpose of lay-
ing venue under section 1391 (e) (4), which locates venue in civil
actions against government officers and agencies in the district
in which "the plaintiff resides." The three courts of appeals to
rule on this question have concluded that 1391 (c) refers only to
the residence of a corporate defendant and that a corporate
91. See, e.g., Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir.
1963); Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J.
1965); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Karebmar, 180 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Sawyer v. Soaring Soc'y of America, 180 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Nash-Ringel v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959);
General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817
(W.D. Mo. 1955); Ronson Art Metal Works v. Brown & Bigelow, 104 F.
Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 199 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1952).
92. This change was especially significant in states with statutes
providing that qualification by foreign corporations did not constitute
consent to be sued by nonresidents on foreign causes of action.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (b) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a dis-
trict court of any matter involving a party who does not inter-
pose timely and sufficient objection to the venue.
The method for objecting to venue is specified in Fmn. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (3).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (1) states the effect of failure to object under rule
12(b) (3).
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plaintiff's residence under 1391(e) (4) is only the district of
the state in which it was incorporated. 94 Two of the circuit
court cases, Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman9 5 and Robert
E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch,96 offer the most persuasive arguments in
favor of a restrictive interpretation of section 1391(c). Three
district court cases, Southern Paperboard Corp. v. United
States,9 7 Freiday v. Cowdin,98 and Upjohn Co. v. Finch,9 9 present
the strongest counterarguments.
Unwilling to read any part of 1391(c) as redundant, the dis-
trict court in Southern Paperboard reasoned that unless con-
strued to permit a corporation to sue other residents of the dis-
tricts in which it is incorporated, licensed, or doing business,
the residence clause would be superfluous:
The statute first gives permission to sue a corporation in any
district where it is incorporated or licensed or doing business.
It then declares that such district shall be regarded as its resi-
dence. No one has suggested any reason for that declaration
unless it was to give permission to the corporation to sue others
in such district in addition to the previously given permission
given to others to sue the corporation in any such district.1 00
But as the court of appeals noted in Veatch, the residence clause
follows the phrase, "may be sued," which clearly refers to cor-
porate defendants. 0 1 Furthermore, the Veatch court reasoned,
the clause in dispute is not redundant. In treating a corporation
as a resident of a district in which it is doing business, the clause
satisfies the need for residence under 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a), there-
by changing the result of the Suttle case.10 2 Thus, in such
a case venue now will lie in any judicial district in which two
or more defendants have common operations, even though they
are incorporated in different states.1 03
In Upjohn Co. v. Finch, the district court focused on the
words "such corporation," concluding that they refer back to the
94. Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970);
Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co. v. Hughes, 323 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1963);
Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 813 (1962).
95. 426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970).
96. 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962).
97. 127 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
98. 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
99. 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
100. 127 F. Supp. at 650.
101. 301 F.2d at 438.
102. Id. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
103. 301 F.2d at 438. See Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426
F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1970); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL P&cTicE AmD PROcEDURE
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opening phrase "a corporation may be sued." Thus, "such cor-
poration" means any corporation amenable to suit, not merely
one that is actually sued.10 4  On the other hand, the Courts of
Appeals for the Second and Fourth Circuits respectively in Man-
chester Modes and Veatch, as well as three distinguished com-
mentators, 10 5 read "such corporation" in a more natural fashion
to mean defendant corporations. The latter all conclude that if
Congress had intended to define the residence of both plaintiff
and defendant corporations, it could easily have begun the section
with "a corporation may sue or be sued" or ended it with "and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of a
corporation for venue purposes."'10 6
Although the courts thus have emphasized the diction and
phraseology of section 1391(c) in an effort to ascertain its scope,
it is doubtful whether these semantic convolutions designed to
give 1391(c) a broad application prove anything at all. At best
they show that the language of the section is ambiguous. At
worst they illuminate how the section most naturally refers only
to corporate defendants. Far more significant, it seems, is the
underlying purpose of 1391(c). On this point, at least, all of
the five representative cases are in agreement.
In Manchester, Judge Friendly expressed doubt that by en-
acting 1391 (c) Congress desired to allow a corporation that does
business in a number of districts to sue in any one of them ir-
respective of the defendant's residence, while on the other hand,
a natural person, similarly doing business in a number of dis-
tricts, would be permitted to sue only in the district of his resi-
0.142 [5.-1-1 (rev. ed. 1974), cited with approval in Robert E. Lee &
Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 1961).
104. 303 F. Supp. at 252-53. Accord, 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AN PROCEDURE § 80, at 387-88 (C. Wright ed. 1960);
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 156 (2d ed. 1970).
105. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SysTEm 959 (1953); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 0.142
[5.1-1] (rev. ed. 1974).
106. Yet another semantic issue involves the meaning of "any ju-
dicial district" in the opening clause, "a corporation may be sued in
any judicial district in which it is incorporated." To the court in Up-john, "any" reflected a congressional realization that a corporate plain-
tiff could reside in more than one judicial district. If Congress had
wished to negate such an interpretation, the court observed, it could
have used the word "the" instead of "any" so that the section would
read: "a corporation may be sued in the judicial district in which it is
incorporated." Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241, 254 (W.D. Mich.
1969).
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dence or in that of the defendant.10 7 Rather, he observed, "a
broadened conception of residence for corporate defendants was
thus 'a response to a general conviction that it was intolerable if
the traditional concepts of residence and presence kept a corpo-
ration from being sued wherever it was creating liabilities.' "108
Moreover, since in addition to the district of the plaintiff's resi-
dence, section 1391(e) provides three other possibilities for
venue, there was no reason to suppose that Congress meant to
provide a corporate plaintiff anything other than residence in
the district of its incorporation.10 9 Finally, a broad reading of
corporate residence under 1391 (c) would automatically expand
a corporate plaintiff's choice of venue 10 under 28 U.S.C. § 1402
(b), the Federal Tort Claims Act, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1398,
which provides for review of Interstate Commerce Commission
orders. These, Judge Friendly concluded, were changes that
Congress was unlikely to have contemplated.1 11
107. 426 F.2d at 632.
108. Id. (quoting Transmirra Products Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co.,
233 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 222
(1957)).
109. Id. at 633.
110. Both statutes permit suit to be brought in the judicial district
in which the plaintiff (or one of the plaintiffs in the case of section 1398)
"resides."
111. The reviser's note to section 1391(c), cited by both Judge
Friendly in Manchester and Judge Sobeloff in Veatch, is remarkably
brief and unilluminating:
In Subsection (c), references to defendants "found" within a
district or voluntarily appearing were omitted. The use of the
word "found" made said section 111 ambiguous. The argument
that an action could be brought in the district where one de-
fendant was "found" was rejected in Camp v. Gress, 1919, 250
U.S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997. However, this ambiguity
will be obviated in the future by the omission of such reference.
Mr. William W. Barron, chief reviser of the 1948 Code, later commented
that at most this obscure note suggests that the omission of the words
"where the defendant shall be found" was intended to avoid the problem
presented in Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948), and
not to redefine corporate residence generally:
[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes
of language in revision unless an intent to make such changes
is clearly expressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no
intent to work a change of meaning but merely an effort to
state in clear and simpler terms the original meaning of the
statute revised.
Barron, The Judicial Code 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 445-46 (1949).
The remarks of two others who had participated in the 1948 revision
also support the proposition that section 1391 (c) was not intended to af-
fect other provisions contained in title 28. Professor J.W. Moore of Yale
University, a special consultant on the revision, stated that "[v] enue pro-
visions have not been altered by the revision." Hearings on H.R. 1600
and H.R. 2055 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1969 (1948). Judge Albert Mars of the Third Cir-
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Although the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the effect
of section 1391 (c) on 1391 (e) (4), it seems that the restrictive
interpretation of the scope of section 1391(c) should apply
in that connection as well and that the expanded defini-
tion of corporate residence contained in that section must not
be superimposed on 1391 (e) (4).
The essence of the argument to the contrary is that to read
the phrase "and such judicial district shall be regarded as the
residence of such corporation for venue purposes" to refer only
to defendant corporations would be to ascribe to Congress the
anomalous intent of treating defendant corporations and plain-
tiff corporations differently." 2 This argument assumes that
there is no basis for unequal treatment. But there is. First,
federal venue laws historically have treated plaintiffs and
defendants unequally, just as they have treated parties in
diversity cases and parties in nondiversity cases unequally." 3
Venue has been geared to the convenience of the defendant
rather than that of the plaintiff, probably because of the realiza-
tion that it is the defendant who is being drawn into court.
Second, practicality and fairness may dictate a more limited
choice of venue for the corporate plaintiff, particularly one that
does business in many states, since an individual defendant is
unlikely to possess comparable resources to litigate far from
home. Third, the benefit of multiple residences for venue pur-
poses would favor corporate plaintifs over individual plaintiffs
who have but one residence.
The precise issue at hand, however, is not whether section
1391 (c) redefines the residence of corporate plaintiffs generally,
but whether it redefines such residence for the purpose of laying
cuit, a member of the revision committee, testified that "[clare has
been taken to make no changes in the existing laws which would not
meet with substantially unanimous approval." Id. at 1595. The Supreme
Court relied heavily on these statements in Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans-
mirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1957), in concluding that sec-
tion 1391 (c) does not enlarge the limited choice of venue in patent
infringement actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (b):
Statements made by several of the persons having importantly
to do with the 1948 revision are uniformly clear that no changes
of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language
in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed .... [I]t will not be inferred that Congress, in
revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their
effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.
Id. at 227.
112. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); ac-
cord, Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241, 253 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
113. Compare § 1391(a) with § 1391(b).
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venue under 1391 (e) (4), which relates to suits against officers
or agencies of the United States. Thus, the image of a mam-
moth, ubiquitous, and malicious corporation suing a tiny, local-
ized, and defenseless individual wherever it chooses is beside
the point. Representatives of the United States Government
defend federal officers who are sued on account of their official
acts; and no corporation can begin to match the federal govern-
ment's total resources.
But even the federal government is entitled to fair and rea-
sonable treatment as a defendant. If residence of a corporate
plaintiff under section 1391(e) (4) were interpreted to include the
broad scope of section 1391(c), a corporation could choose its
favorite officer defendant, sue him in any district in which it
was doing business, and accomplish extraterritorial service in
accordance with the last sentence of 1391 (e). Such a result
would be indefensible. Cases are more conveniently, accurately,
and fairly tried in locations having some connection with the
claim, such as the real residence of a party or the location of
the evidence and witnesses. A venue statute, particularly one
that automatically provides extraterritorial personal jurisdic-
tion, should not be interpreted so as to permit naked forum-
shopping among the federal courts by plaintiffs who can claim
extra residences. True, transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) to any other district where the claim could have been
brought"4 might serve to prevent any such abuse of a broadly
construed section 1391 (e) (4). 1 The existence of a possible
safety valve, however, fails to justify a strained construction of
the venue statute in the first instance, especially when such a
construction is unnecessary. The narrow reading of 1391 (e) (4)
would still locate venue wherever any defendant resides, the
claim arose, any realty involved in the suit is located, any cor-
porate plaintiff is incorporated, or any individual coplaintiff
114. Section 1404(a) permits a district court to transfer a civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought. In
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme Court held that a
district where the action might have been brought is the one in which
at the outset the plaintiff has the right to sue regardless of the wishes
of the defendant. If under the applicable venue statute a plaintiff cannot
bring the action in a district without the defendant's acquiescence, then
a transfer to such district is outside the scope of section 1404(a). More-
over, it is irrelevant that the defendant may subsequently subject himself
to suit in the district either by consent or waiver of venue.
115. The courts noted this possibility in Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d
504, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and in Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241,
253 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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resides. These options include every district remotely related to
a legal controversy. In the absence of a clear statutory direc-
tive to the contrary, they should be deemed exclusive.
Nevertheless, from a practical standpoint, a corporate plain-
tiff wishing to establish venue under section 1391 (e) (4) in a
district where it is licensed to do business or is doing business,
but where venue is otherwise unavailable under section 1391 (e),
ought to recognize that a number of district courts have ap-
proved the broad interpretation of corporate residence. Even
so, one risk in seeking out a friendly court cannot be avoided:
if the Government interposes a timely challenge to venue and
later loses the suit on the merits, the venue question invites an
appeal.
IV. VENUE IN THE DISTRICT WHERE REAL
PROPERTY IS SITUATED
Paragraph 3 of section 1391 (e) provides that in a civil action
brought against a federal agency or officer, venue will lie in any
district in which "any real property involved in the action is
situated." This clause is probably the least significant and
is certainly the least complicated portion of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962. It, of course, complements section 1391 (e)
(4), which lays venue in any district in which the plaintiff
resides "if no real property is involved in the action." But be-
cause it is not tied to the plaintiff's residence, paragraph 3 poses
no special problems to a corporate plaintiff.
Nowhere does the legislative history explain what consti-
tutes "real property." This unfortunate omission is confusing
since Anglo-American law recognizes an almost infinite variety
of partial and contingent interests, legal and equitable, in realty,
and since many kinds of actions arguably involve real property,
such as actions to quiet title, foreclose on a mortgage or lien,
abate a nuisance, or recover damages for trespass. In National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 11 6 the district court square-
ly faced the problem of what constitutes "real property" under
section 1391(e). The plaintiff, an environmental protection.
organization, brought suit to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity from purchasing and using coal that allegedly had been
extracted by strip-mining in violation of the National Envi-
116. 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ronmental Policy Act of 1969.11 Relying on section 1391 (e) (4),
the plaintiff sought to lay venue in the Southern District of New
York, its residence and an appropriate venue if no real property
were involved in the action. In challenging venue, the defen-
dant corporation argued that 1391 (e) (4) by its very language
could not apply; the action amounted to a suit to abate a nuisance
stemming from the improper use of realty or, in the alternative,
an action in trespass, either one of which involved realty. The
court concluded, however, that the connection between the al-
leged actions and the land did not involve a "right, title or inter-
est" in the land and therefore was insignificant:
Almost any dispute over public or private decisions will in some
way "involve real property," taken literally. The touchstone
for applying Sec. 1391(e) (4) cannot sensibly be whether real
property is marginally affected by the case at issue. Rather,
the action must center directly on the real property, as with
actions concerning the right, title or interest in the real prop-
erty.118
Applying a similar test, another district court concluded that
an action to enjoin the Army Corps of Engineers from construc-
ting a dam did not directly involve realty for purposes of section
1391 (e) (3),"1 and that under 1391 (e) (4) the action could be
brought where at least some of the plaintiffs resided. Similarly,
an action against the Commandant of the Coast Guard challeng-
ing the issuance of a permit to build a bridge was held not to
involve realty, on the theory that 1391(e) (3) requires a connec-
tion with real property that is more than peripheral. 120
If an action does directly involve a right, title, or interest
in real estate, although precluded from (e) (4), a plaintiff may
seek to establish venue under section 1391(e)(1), (e)(2), or
(e) (3); it is not mandatory that suit be brought in the district in
which the realty is located. Venue would be problematical,
however, if 1931(e) (4) were invoked in a case that involves
realty extending over more than one district. The statute fails
to provide for this situation and the case law offers no help. In
such circumstances, venue probably would lie in any one of the
districts. There seems to be no rational way to identify the more
representative district if, for example, one-half of the tract in-
volved is located in one district and one-half is in an adjoining
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
113. 340 F. Supp. at 406.
119. Environmental Defense Fund v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F.
Supp. 728, 732 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
120. Delaware v. Bender, 370 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974).
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district. Whether the same reasoning would apply if the division
were 95 percent : 5 percent is less obvious, but even in that case
the result should be identical. Counting acres seems an inappro-
priate and arbitrary method of determining venue. And in any
event, the literal language of 1391 (e) (3) provides that the
realty in fact "is situated" in both districts.
Because of the narrow construction of actions "involving
realty," it is unlikely that section 1391(e) (3) often will be the
basis on which a corporate plaintiff suing a government agency
or officer will seek to establish venue. Such actions are far
more likely to involve a dispute over the validity of agency regu-
lations or the plaintiff's compliance with them. And even law-
suits challenging agency action that directly affects real estate,
such as Environmental Protection Agency orders that restrict
the use of land and plant, will not satisfy the right-title-interest
test.
But this is how the law should be. The right-title-interest
test accurately reflects the reason why Congress included section
1391 (e) (3) in the 1962 Act: to permit private individuals claim-
ing interests in public lands, particularly lands located in west-
ern states, to bring their actions where the land is located, rather
than in Washington, D.C.12 1 To construe 1391 (e) (3) to cover
any kind of action that tangentially affects real estate would be
to ignore the legislative history of the Act and to provide a
choice of venue that is unnecessary in view of the opportunities
afforded by the other three paragraphs of the section.1 22
V. VENUE IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THE CAUSE
OF ACTION AROSE
Paragraph 2 of section 1391 (e) contains the final basis for
laying venue in actions against government officers or agencies.
Such a suit may be brought in any judicial district in which "the
cause of action arose." Like all the other parts of section
121. S. REP. No. 1992, supra note 12, at 6-7.
122. Actions in which real property is "involved" are not limited to
"local actions," 1 J. MooRE, FEDEaAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 0.142[7],
at 1444 n.10 (rev. ed. 1974), in which the court must have jurisdiction
over the res to afford relief, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 459
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). With respect to local actions, however, it might
be argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1392(b), which expressly governs venue in
such cases, is a specific statutory exception that overrides section 1391
(e) (3), see text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. The question has not
arisen.
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1391 (e), paragraph 2 is phrased in the alternative; there is no
requirement that the claim be brought in the district in which
it arose. Thus, it is unlikely that an individual plaintiff suing
a government officer would need to rely on this paragraph, be-
cause venue also would be proper in the district of the plaintiff's
residence, which is probably the most convenient place for a pri-
vate citizen to bring suit. On the other hand, venue in the dis-
trict where the cause of action arose is of considerable signifi-
cance to a corporation since such a plaintiff's "residence" may be
limited to the district of its incorporation under the restrictive
interpretation of section 1391(e) (4) and section 1391(c). Espe-
cially in the case of a corporation that does business in many
states, the district where the cause of action arose may be a more
convenient place to sue than the district of incorporation.
The choice of the phrase "cause of action" to determine
venue is surprising and confusing. First, it is inexplicably in-
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which, in
addition to consolidating into one "civil action"'123 the many dif-
ferent forms of action that had existed before 1938, make the
plaintiff's claim for relief the basis of a lawsuit,'2 thereby
avoiding the troublesome question of what constitutes a cause
of action. Second, the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs125 implicitly rejected the notion that there exists such
a thing as a unitary cause of action. Of course, any difficulties
in construing "cause of action" could be eliminated by simply
reading it to mean "claim" or "claim for relief," a solution that
Professor Moore recommends. 12 6 "Cause of action" would then
embrace "all legal theories and all forms of relief to which the
plaintiff may be entitled under the facts.'12 7  In support of this
proposition, Congress does appear to have treated "cause of ac-
tion" and "claim for relief" as different expressions of the same
concept. Both phrases appear in different parts of section
1391,128 and there is no indication that the result Congress in-
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) states that the complaint shall contain,
among other things, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."
125. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
126. 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE f 0.142 [5.-2], at
1431-32 (rev. ed. 1974).
127. Id.
128. In 1966 Congress amended sections 1391(a) and 1391(b) to pro-
vide for venue in the district "in which the claim arose." Act of Nov. 2,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111.
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tended to achieve in one is any different from the result it con-
templated in another. The issue has never arisen. 2 9
In any event, the question concerning the proper definition
of a "cause of action" is but half the inquiry that section 1391
129. There is a possibility, however, that a court called on to con-
strue the phrase "cause of action" in this context might give it the highly
technical meaning that had evolved before 1391(e) was enacted. With
remarkable uniformity, the pre-1962 cases hold that a cause of action
consists of two basic elements: a primary right belonging to the plaintiff
and a wrong done by the defendant that breaches the plaintiff's right
and entitles him to seek relief. See, e.g., Burns Bros. v. Central R.R.,
202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953); McMahon v. United States, 186 F.2d 227 (3d
Cir. 1950), affd, 342 U.S. 25 (1951); Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ranney-
Davis Mercantile Co., 173 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1949); Helmers v. Anderson,
156 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1946), affd sub nom. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S.
461 (1947); Blair v. Durham, 134 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1943); Greene v.
Wilson, 150 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957), affd, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.
1958), rev'd on other grounds sub nomn. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959); Dorney v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 149 F. Supp. 615(D.N.J. 1957); Bowerman v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 105 F. Supp.
119 (N.D. Tex. 1952); Anderson v. Andrews, 62 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa.
1945), rev'd, 156 F.2d 972 (3th Cir. 1946), rev'd sub nom. Cope v. Ander-
son, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
The classic definition of cause of action appears in Baltimore S.S. Co.
v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927):
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful
violation of a right which the facts show. The number and
variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause
of action so long as their result, whether they be considered
severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by
a single legal wrong.
The Supreme Court specifically reaffirmed the single-wrong test in
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951), where it held
that even if the wrong which the plaintiff alleges derives from an inter-
locked series of transactions, there is but a single wrong and a single
cause of action.
Recently, however, the continued validity of the concept of "cause
of action" as the wrongful invasion of a legally protected interest has
been called into question by such landmark cases as Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). In both cases the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff possesses standing to seek relief in federal court if
he alleges injury in fact, economic or otherwise, actual or imminent, to
an interest of his own that arguably is within the zone of interests in-
tended to be regulated or protected by the law in question. Of course,
Data Processing and Barlow purported to deal only with the require-
ments of standing, not with the ingredients of a claim or cause of action.
Nevertheless, these two key cases indicate that the newly relaxed stand-
ing requirements, far from imposing an additional hurdle to the presen-
tation of a claim, may in reality enlarge the scope of judicially cognizable
claims. "Cause of action" may now mean no more than a describable
injury to the plaintiff that the courts have power to redress-a claim for
relief. Thus, Data Processing and Barlow may have made Professor
Moore's assumption correct.
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(e) (2) necessitates. An equally if not more difficult problem is
determining where the cause of action arose. If cause of action
is defined as a wrongful invasion of a legally protected or pro-
tectable interest, it seems that the action logically could be said
to arise in two places: where the wrongful act was committed or
where the plaintiff suffered the resulting injury. Of course, if a
single wrongful act occurs and damage ensues in the same district,
by either theory the cause of action would have arisen in that dis-
trict, and venue properly would lie there.130 Many activities
that give rise to litigation, however, extend across district and
state boundaries. An extreme, though not implausible, exam-
ple serves to illustrate this situation. Assume that raw materials
are extracted in one district, shipped to a second for fabrication
according to specifications devised in a third, then transported
to a wholesaler in a fourth district for subsequent distribution
to a retailer in a fifth who sells the finished product to a buyer
residing in a sixth who consumes it in a seventh and finally dies
in an eighth. Under the locus-of-injury approach, the cause of
action would have arisen in either district seven or eight; under
the locus-of-evil-act approach the cause of action would have
arisen in one or more of the first six districts.
In Helmers v. Anderson'31 the court of appeals chose the
evil act test and, to eliminate any possible confusion over which
evil act really counts, made the defendant's final act determina-
tive:
The place where a cause of action arises is the place where the
operative facts that give rise to the action occur. Although it
may be necessary that a number of separate facts exist in order
to create a cause of action, yet it is the happening of the last
of such facts which brings the cause of action into existence.
Such an act, or the failure to act where there is a duty to act,
is the critical event which transforms a potential liability into
one presently enforceable.132
Applying this "final act" standard, the court concluded that the
statutory liability of an insolvent national bank's shareholders
to the United States together with a demand for satisfaction of
that liability by the receiver did not constitute a cause of action.
Rather, an action arose only when the shareholders failed to pay
their assessments on the date they were due. Thus, the place
130. Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 293 F. Sum).
1135 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
131. 156 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1946).
132. Id. at 50.
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where the shareholders failed to comply with the order to pay
was the place where the cause of action arose.
In Anderson v. Andrews 133 another court of appeals, tacitly
focusing on the locus of the injury, reached an opposite result
in a case presenting identical facts. Again the question was
whether the demand by a receiver of an insolvent national bank
that the bank's shareholders pay the statutory assessment and
the shareholders' failure to comply constituted a cause of action
that arose at the place of noncompliance. Because the share-
holders' liability on their stock was not contractual but statu-
tory, the court reasoned, the location of the receiver's office was
irrelevant. The real recipient and obhgee was the Comptroller
General of the United States, who was located in Washington,
D.C., not in Kentucky where the suit was brought. Having con-
cluded that the action did not arise in Kentucky, the court
avoided deciding where, in fact, it had arisen.
Reviewing both cases simultaneously sub nomine Cope v.
Anderson,'34 the Supreme Court affirmed Helmers and reversed
Andrews, concluding that in And'rews the cause of action had
indeed arisen in Kentucky. The Court reasoned that all of the
events that culminated in the suit occurred in Kentucky, the
receiver's office was located there, and the payment of the as-
sessments could have been made there. "Practically everything
that preceded the final fixing of liability of shareholders derived
from Kentucky transactions."'135
In affirming Helmers and overruling Andrews, the Supreme
Court neither explicitly rejected a locus-of-injury test nor ap-
proved a locus-of-evil-act test. It did, however, attempt to
determine where the preponderance of the wrongful acts had
occurred, an approach that suggests disapproval of the place
of injury as a basis for determining where a cause of action
arises. Whether the Court would have reached the same con-
clusion had it been clear exactly where the Comptroller had
suffered the injury is impossible to say. After all, it is simply
impossible to determine just where the United States Treasury
was injured by the shareholders' failure to pay the statutory
assessment. The Court did not advert to this issue and, conse-
quently, Cope may only stand for the proposition that in the
absence of a definitive showing that an injury occurred in a
133. 156 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1946).
134. 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
135. Id. at 467.
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particular place, the cause of action will be found to have arisen
in the district where the preponderance of illegal acts occurred.
Most of the more recent decisions concerning the knotty
problem of where a cause of action arises have assumed that
the locus of some wrongful act, rather than the locus of injury,
is determinative. But instead of looking to the last act in the
chain of events that culminates in a lawsuit, the majority of
courts have stressed the particular act they found to be the real
basis of the plaintiff's grievance. In Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,1 36 for
example, the district court held that venue was proper in the
District of Colorado, not only by virtue of the plaintiff's res-
idence there, but also because Colorado was the district in which
the underlying labor dispute had occurred and, therefore, the
one in which the cause of action arose. In Kletschka v. Driver,137
an action for an injunction and for damages deriving from the
allegedly illegal transfer of a doctor from a Veterans Admin-
istration hospital in the Northern District of New York to an-
other hospital outside of New York, the court of appeals simply
assumed that the claim had arisen in the Northern District so
that venue there was proper under either section 1391(b) or
section 1391(e) (2). 138 And in United States ex rel. Flemings
v. Chafee,139 the district court held that a suit to compel cor-
rection of military records which included the judgment of an al-
legedly illegal court-martial could be properly brought in the
district where the court-martial had occurred.
Still another approach had been taken in an earlier case,
Rechany v. Roland. 40 There, the district court held that an
action to set aside the suspension of a merchant mariner's
documents by the Commandant of the Coast Guard could be
properly maintained in the district where the suspension hear-
ings had been conducted. It concluded that the cause of action
arose not where the final act occurred, nor where the crystal-
136. 290 F. Supp. 612 (D. Colo. 1968).
137. 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969).
138. In view of the attempt by this Article to define "cause of
action," it is interesting to note that the Second Circuit also assumed
that there is no distinction between the judicial district in which "the
claim arose" (section 1391(b)) and the judicial district in which "the
cause of action arose" (section 1391 (e) (2)). See 411 F.2d at 442.
139. 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 458 F.2d 544, rev'd on
other grounds sub nora. Warner v. Flemings, 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
140. 235 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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lizing event took place, but "where the initial action was
taken."141
In view of the scarcity of recent cases dealing with the
issue of where a cause of action arises and the lack of searching
analysis in those that do, it is impossible to describe the present
state of the law under section 1391(e) (2). Any test for deter-
mining where a cause of action arises that turns on a single
wrongful event or act-whether it be the initial act, the key act,
or the final act-is, however, unsatisfactory. First, the assump-
tion that a claim is the product of one preeminent act is often
unrealistic. Second, even if there were only one standard in the
federal courts, just which of these acts should constitute the
magic one for venue purposes remains open to reasonable dis-
pute. Assume, for example, that the Federal Energy Admin-
istration (FEA) and a small oil company, chartered in Delaware
but doing most of its business in Texas, dispute the control price
for oil. The oil company continues to charge prices allegedly
in excess of the lawful base price, and the FEA issues a notice
of proposed violation. After a hearing the FEA orders a rollback
and a return of moneys unlawfully collected. The company
then sues for a declaration that the administrative order is il-
legal and for an injunction against its enforcement. Where did
the cause of action arise?
The FEA would argue that the cause of action arose in
Washington, D.C. for the following reasons: The order mandat-
ing a price rollback was the key event or final act giving rise to
the company's grievance; the decision to issue the order was
made in Washington; and it was drafted and promulgated
there. Thus, any wrong to the company derives solely from an
official act or acts performed in Washington.
In seeking to establish that the cause of action arose in
Texas, the company would respond that if there had been any
violation, it occurred in Texas where the oil was sold in excess
of lawful prices. This, and not the order, was the final act or
key event leading to liability on its part. Furthermore, any
subsequent enforcement proceedings deemed necessary would
be brought in Texas by the local United States Attorney on
the recommendation of the FEA Regional Administrator in
Texas. Finally, even if the rollback order were the final act or
key event, the real wrong was not the promulgation of the order
in Washington but the harm it would produce in Texas, that is,
141. Id. at 80 n.1 (emphasis added).
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causing substantial monetary loss to a company that does most
of its business there.
From this hypothetical lawsuit it should be evident that the
question of where a cause of action arises is susceptible to a
variety of plausible answers depending on such abstractions as
time and causation. 142 However, metaphysical arguments that
are unlikely to produce a consensus seem entirely inappropriate
to the interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. Instead,
the answer can be best derived by asking where, in view of the
result that section 1391(e) was designed to achieve, venue should
lie if it cannot be founded upon the residence of a defendant, the
residence of the plaintiff, or the location of realty.
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 unquestionably was
intended to facilitate the ability of private plaintifs, including
corporate plaintiffs, to sue officers and agencies of the federal
government outside of Washington, D.C. The present inter-
pretation of the genesis of a cause of action, however, which
focuses on a particular wrongful act of the defendant, in effect
gives a defendant who in the first instance contemplates litiga-
tion an opportunity to determine where the cause of action will
arise and thus where venue will lie. Since most official action
by the federal government occurs at the capital, venue under
section 1391(e) (2) would lie almost invariably in the District of
Columbia.
This result could be avoided if a cause of action were also
deemed to arise in the district or districts in which the plaintiff
was injured. No irresistible logic compels the conclusion that
the origin of a cause of action depends solely on some wrongful
act done by the defendant. A wrongful act is merely the first
half of a "cause of action." Under any theory, a cause of action
is based both on a wrong done by the defendant and a breach
of the plaintiffs right that entitles him to seek relief. And in
reality it is not the underlying technical wrong that motivates
most lawsuits. Rather, it is the consequence of that wrong-
injury suffered by the plaintiff-that moves him to seek judicial
relief. Thus, to include the locus of the resulting injury as one
142. In Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir.
1970), Judge Friendly adverted to this problem in noting that the claim
before the court could be said to have arisen in the District of Columbia,
where the challenged congressional subpoenas were prepared and mailed
and the records were to be produced, or in the Southern District of New
York, where the subpoenas were received and the records kept--or per-
haps in both. Id. at 1382 n.4.
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place where a case of action "arises" would seem perfectly con-
sistent with the full import of "cause of action."'1 43
One court has adopted this approach. In Kroger Co. v.
Adkins,144 an action for contribution to a products liability set-
tlement, the district court concluded that a retailer's claims
against the supplier and motor carrier arose in the district in
which some of the victims of contaminated fish had died. 45 The
Kroger case highlights one obvious advantage of an alternative
locus-of-injury test-trial could be held in the place where proof
of injury, necessary either to obtain damages or an injunction,
is likely to be found.
If such a test were adopted for purposes of applying section
1391(e) (2), a new problem would arise-determining exactly
where a plaintiff suffered injury. Thus, since the effects of a
defendant's wrongful act could be easily felt in more than one
district, some further narrowing of the locus-of-injury test may
seem necessary if it is to be of any practical application. But
attempting to isolate one particular district from several possi-
bilities as the district in which the plaintiff was injured would
be as difficult and unrewarding a task as attempting to deter-
mine which of many wrongful acts committed by a defendant
constitutes the determinative wrongful act under the locus-of-
evil-act test.
All of these problems could be avoided by recognizing that
the wrong done the plaintiff may be the result of multiple,
interdependent acts of the defendant, and that the plaintiff's
injury therefore may consist of multiple injuries suffered in
different districts. In other words, the law should provide that
a cause of action may arise in more than one place.146 To this
143. It might be anomalous to the legal purist, however, who would
say that a cause of action can arise in only one place, and that must be
the place where the defendant's actions crystallized into legal liability.
Such a stand, however, would make it impossible to avoid the serious
interpretative problems discussed previously.
144. 284 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Kroger Co.
v. Dornbos, 408 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1969).
145. Venue was laid where the claim arose under section 1391(a),
the diversity suit counterpart to section 1391 (e) (2).
146. This is the position taken by the American Law Institute in its
proposed revision of the prevailing venue rules. While the Institute does
not go so far as to provide for venue where the plaintiff suffered injury,
its recommended section 1326(a) (1) does provide that a civil action of
the kind presently governed by section 1391(e) (2) may be brought in
a district wherein "a substantial part of the events or omissions giv-
ing rise to the claim occurred." A1rmnRcAx LAw INsTrr=, Suny oF
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end, section 1391(e) might be either interpreted or amended
as follows:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof .. may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district
in which: ... (2) a substantial part of the events or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred, or one or more plaintiffs
incurred substantial injury.
Such an interpretation or statutory amendment would neatly
resolve the problem of determining where the cause of action
arose in the hypothetical suit between the Delaware oil company
and the FEA. Venue certainly would lie in some Texas district
under the suggested second clause of paragraph 2 and perhaps
under the first clause as well. Alternatively, venue might lie in
Washington, D.C., perhaps under clause one and certainly under
section 1391(e) (1), which provides for laying venue where a
defendant resides. The choice, of course, would be the plaintiff's,
and with a clearer understanding of the effect of 1391 (e) (2), he
could make that choice intelligently.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expanding volume of federal regulatory legislation to-
gether with recently liberalized rules of standing and ripeness
inevitably have increased the frequency with which private
corporations sue the Government for relief from restrictions on
their profit-making activities. While the doctrine of sovereign
immunity bars unconsented suits against the United States ex-
cept in those comparatively few instances where a special stat-
ute waives this privileged status, aggrieved parties may usually
obtain injunctive or declaratory relief by suing a named federal
officer and alleging performance of acts in excess of his statu-
tory authority. Determining where such suits can be brought is
a matter of considerable importance to a corporate plaintiff.
Not only is such knowledge necessary to avoid dismissal of the
suit on the ground of improper venue before the merits of the
claim are even considered, but an awareness of the available
forums is also essential to an intelligent decision as to whether
in terms of cost, convenience, or predicted outcome it is advis-
able to sue in the first place.
Venue in civil actions against federal agencies or officers
acting in their official capacities is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391
THE DIWsiow op JuRIsDicTioN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDmiAL COURTS § 1326,
at 43 (1968).
122 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:81
(e), which provides any plaintiff with four alternative methods
for locating a suitable forum and, once that is accomplished,
with the opportunity to serve nonresident defendants by certi-
fied mail. If the various provisions of 1391 (e) are applied in
the manner suggested in this Article, a corporate plaintiff suing
such an agency or officer should. have an adequate range of
choice among different forum districts, all of which bear some
rational connection to the lawsuit. And that is what section
1391 (e) was meant to provide.
